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WEAK ASSERTION
By Luca Incurvati ∗ and Julian J. Schlo¨der ∗
We present an inferentialist account of the epistemic modal operator might. Our starting point is the
bilateralist programme. A bilateralist explains the operator not in terms of the speech act of rejection;
we explain the operator might in terms of weak assertion, a speech act whose existence we argue for
on the basis of linguistic evidence. We show that our account of might provides a solution to certain
well-known puzzles about the semantics of modal vocabulary whilst retaining classical logic. This
demonstrates that an inferentialist approach to meaning can be successfully extended beyond the core
logical constants.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we address two prima facie unrelated problems. The first problem
is that of explaining themeaning of epistemic vocabulary in a way that provides
a satisfactory solution to certain linguistic puzzles (Yalcin 2007; Schnieder 2010;
Dorr & Hawthorne 2013; Moss 2015; Russell & Hawthorne 2016).
The second problem is that of establishing inferentialism as a serious con-
tender in the theory of meaning. We take Timothy Williamson to express a
common sentiment when he writes that
[i]f youwant an explicit theory of how some particular linguistic construction contributes
to the meanings of sentences in which it occurs, the inferentialist is unlikely to have
one.(Williamson 2010, 23)
Inferentialists must do better. As Greg Restall puts it, if we truly want to
make advances in proof-theoretic semantics, we need from inferentialists
more work on the range of applications in the theory of meaning for speech acts beyond
assertion and concepts beyond the core logical constants.(Restall 2016)
We make a start on the project of extending inferentialism beyond the core
logical constants by developing an inferentialist account of epistemic modals.
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2 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
As we shall see, this account provides a natural and elegant solution to the
epistemic puzzles. This, we hope, shows that the prospects for vindicating
inferentialism are brighter than usually assumed.
Our starting point is the bilateral framework (Smiley 1996; Rumfitt 2000;
Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017). This framework has been used to explain the
operator not through the speech act of rejection. In this paper, we extend the
bilateral framework to a multilateral one, and use the result to explain the
operator might through the speech act of weak assertion. The upshot is a theory
of epistemic modality which is both inferentialist and expressivist, in that it
accounts for the meaning ofmight in terms of its inferential connections to speech
acts expressing certain attitudes.
We begin by presenting the epistemic puzzles about might and introducing
our preferred understanding of the bilateralist approach. Next, we provide
evidence for the existence of a distinctive speech act of weak assertion and
show how to embed it in the bilateral framework. This gives rise to the novel
epistemic multilateral logic, which we use to inferentially explain might and solve
the epistemic puzzles.
II. EPISTEMIC PUZZLES
A number of linguistic puzzles have been taken to show that a satisfactory
account of epistemicmodals requires extensive failures of classical logic (e.g.Willer
2013), unless one adopts complex pragmatic machineries (Dorr & Hawthorne
2013). We review these epistemic puzzles. Later in the paper, we give a natural
account of might which solves the puzzles while retaining classical logic.
Yalcin’s puzzle. Seth Yalcin (2007) observed that epistemic might differs in its
embedding behaviour from self-reported ignorance of the contrary.
(1) #a. It is raining and I don’t know that it is raining.
b. Suppose it is raining and I don’t know that it is raining.
c. If it is raining and I don’t know that it is raining, ...
#d. It is raining and it might not be raining.
#e. Suppose it is raining and it might not be raining.
#f. If it is raining and it might not be raining, ...
(1a) is a version of Moore’s paradox. The typical explanation of its infelicity
is pragmatic: asserting that it is raining pragmatically entails I know that it is raining,
which contradicts I don’t know that it is raining. This pragmatic entailment is
suspended under suppose and if. The typical explanation therefore predicts that
(1b) and (1c) should be felicitous, as is indeed the case.
Comparing (1a,b,c) with (1d,e,f) shows that the explanation for the infelicity
of (1d) cannot be the usual pragmatic one. For the pragmatic explanation
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WEAK ASSERTION 3
predicts that (1e) and (1f) should be felicitous, which they are not. Thus, a
desideratum for a theory of epistemic modality is to explain why p and it might
not p sounds infelicitous even in certain embedded contexts. However, if we
explain this by taking p and it might not p to be semantically contradictory, classical
logic entails that if might p, then p, trivialising might. This hints at an underlying
problem, recently spelled out by Jeffrey S. Russell and John Hawthorne (2016).
Triviality. Say that an epistemic state S rules out a proposition p if updating S
with p results in an absurd state. Then the following are plausible assumptions
regarding the dynamics of might and not:
(MIGHT) Any epistemic state not ruling out might p does not rule out p.
(NOT) Updating any epistemic state with not p yields a state that rules out p.
However, Russell & Hawthorne (2016, 326) show, if we accept (MIGHT)
and (NOT), we appear to have committed ourselves to might p entailing p. The
proof goes as follows.
Suppose for reductio that some epistemic state, when updated with not p,
yields a state S that does not rule out might p. By (MIGHT), whenever might
p is not ruled out, p is not ruled out. Thus, S does not rule out p either. This
contradicts (NOT). By reductio, updating any state with not p yields a state that
rules out might p. That is, when a state is updated with not p and then might p, it
results in an absurd state. However, the Commutativity of update tells us that
updating with A and then with B has the same effect as updating with B and
then with A. Hence, updating a state with might p and then with not p results in
an absurd state. That is, updating any state with might p rules out not p. Now
in dynamic logic, A entails B just in case updating any state with A results in a
state that rules out not B. Therefore, might p entails p.
Russell & Hawthorne (2016, 336) conclude that if we want to hold on to
(MIGHT) and (NOT), ‘the only real option is to go in for some account
that violates Commutativity’. Doing so is in fact typical for dynamic accounts
(Veltman 1996; Willer 2013). However, these accounts constitute major depar-
tures from classical logic.
Modal disagreement. In broad outline, the orthodox approach to epistemicmodal-
ity takes might p to say that p is compatible with some contextually determined
body of knowledge (Kratzer 1977; DeRose 1991). Now consider the following
dialogue.
(2) Alice: I can’t find the keys.
Bob: They might be in the car.
Alice: No, they are not in the car. I just checked.
Alice and Bob appear to disagree. However, it is difficult to locate a propo-
sition about a single body of knowledge that Bob is warranted in asserting and
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4 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
Alice is warranted in rejecting. Several writers have concluded that to account
for modal disagreement cases such as (2) we need to modify or supplement
the orthodox account with unorthodox features (Egan et al. 2005; MacFarlane
2014).
III. BILATERALISM
Bilateralism emerged as an attempt to reconcile the inferentialist approach
to meaning with classical logic. Here we show that, in addition, it can be
regarded as a form of inferential expressivism: a view which combines features of
the inferentialist and expressivist programmes.
Inferentialism and bilateralism. Inferentialism is the view that the meaning of an
expression is given by its inferential role. Those who accept inferentialism
about logical expressions typically take their inferential role to be captured by
their introduction and elimination rules in a natural deduction system. The
result is logical inferentialism: the view that the meaning of the logical constants is
given by their introduction and elimination rules (Gentzen 1935; Prawitz 1965;
Dummett 1991).
A major challenge for logical inferentialism is that not every pair of in-
troduction and elimination rules seems to confer a coherent meaning on the
constant involved (Prior 1960).1 One way of meeting this challenge is to re-
quire a certain balance between introduction and elimination rules, known
as harmony (Dummett 1991; Tennant 1997). As Dummett (1991) pointed out,
however, whilst the harmony requirement rules out the known problematic
cases, it also appears to sanction intuitionistic logic, since the rules for classical
negation in a standard natural deduction system do not seem harmonious.
According to bilateralists, appearances are deceiving: it is the restriction of
standard natural deduction systems to asserted content that prevents one from
giving an inferentialist explanation of classical negation. Once rejected content
is countenanced—as it should be—one can formulate harmonious rules for
classical logic (Rumfitt 2000). Thus, bilateralism holds that the meaning of the
logical constants should be given by conditions on both assertion and rejection.
Assertion and rejection are speech acts, which express attitudes towards propo-
sitions: assertion expresses assent, rejection expresses dissent. A fundamental
property of these two attitudes is that they are incompatible: it is absurd to
simultaneously have them towards the same proposition. This is not to say
that it is impossible to assent and dissent from the same proposition. But some-
one knowingly doing so would be incoherent and experience this incoherence
1 Prior’s example is the connective tonk, characterized by the introduction rule ‘From A infer
A tonk B’ and the elimination rule ‘From A tonk B infer B’. Since these rules trivialize the logic,
tonk is usually taken to be incoherent (but see Warren 2015 for a different take on the matter).
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WEAK ASSERTION 5
as cognitive dissonance (which may be resolved by compartmentalizing one’s
incompatible attitudes).
Following Gottlob Frege (1919), Timothy Smiley (1996) argues that assertion
and rejection can be realised by answering yes or no to polar questions posed
to oneself.
(3) a. Is it the case that p? Yes!
b. Is it the case that p? No!
c. Is it the case that not p? Yes!
Smiley understands (3a) as a linguistic realisation of asserting p and (3b) as a
realisation of rejecting p. Thus, p is the content of a speech act indicated by the
words yes and no, i.e. yes and no are force-indicators (Incurvati & Smith 2009).
Rejection as in (3b) and negative assertion as in (3c) are treated as distinct
phenomena (Smiley 1996).
On Smiley’s account, (3b) and (3c) are still inferentially equivalent: in a fixed
context, the same inferences can be drawn from an utterance of (3b) and
(3c). But there is substantial debate about whether this is correct and what
the attitude of dissent is (compare Rumfitt 1997, 2000; Dummett 2002; Dickie
2010). Imogen Dickie points out that whilst one may reject a proposition on
grounds of falsity, there aremany other reasons for doing so. In the former case,
the rejection is strong, i.e., it is inferentially equivalent to a negative assertion.
In the latter case, it need not be: it may be weak. In previous work (Incurvati &
Schlo¨der 2017), we give the following as an example of a weak rejection.
(4) Is Franz here? No, not as far as I know.
Here, the speaker is expressing dissent from Franz is here on grounds of igno-
rance, not of falsity, and it would be mistaken to infer that she assents to Franz
is not here.
Thus, if rejections can be weak, it is erroneous to treat (3b) and (3c) as
inferentially equivalent: (3c) is potentially more informative. To make sense of
this, we take no as a force-indicator for weak rejection and dissent to consist in
finding a proposition unassertible (see Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017). The fact that no
often conveys strong rejection is explained by appealing to a general pragmatic
pressure tomaximize contrariness (Horn 1989): falsity is contrary to assertibility
(whereas unassertibility is its contradictory), so, typically, a weak rejection is
pragmatically strengthened to a strong one (see Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017, §7).
In our extension of bilateralism to weak rejection, classical logic is the logic
of assent. That is, assent to A1, A2, . . . , An bilaterally entails assent to B just in
case B is classically derivable from A1, A2, . . . , An. However, whilst standard
bilateralist calculi for strong rejections are harmonious (Smiley 1996; Rumfitt
2000), harmony is lost in the system we presented in (Incurvati & Schlo¨der
2017). One of the strengths of the account we will develop is that it is faithful
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6 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
to the linguistic phenomena by allowing for weak rejection, but it restores
harmony by including the speech act of weak assertion to be introduced below.
Expressivism and bilateralism. Expressivism about a class of linguistic terms holds
that themeaning of these terms is to be explained via their putative connections
to speech acts expressing attitudes. Traditional expressivism takes this connec-
tion to be direct: the meaning of terms from the relevant class is explained by
taking those very terms to express an attitude. For instance, traditional ethical
expressivism takes it is good that p to express moral approval towards p (Ayer
1936; Stevenson 1937).
Bilateralism is a form of expressivism in that it explains the meaning of the
logical constants via their connections to assertion and rejection (expressing,
respectively, assent and dissent). However, bilateralism should be distinguished
from traditional expressivism. According to bilateralism, the meaning of the
logical constants does not consist in the expression of assent and dissent but
derives from it. We can illustrate this difference by considering how bilateralism
deals with the Frege–Geach problem besetting traditional expressivism (see
Schroeder 2008b for an overview).
Traditional expressivism about negation takes not to indicate rejection, ex-
pressing dissent. The Frege–Geach argument against this view now goes as
follows (Frege 1919; Geach 1965). Consider the following seemingly valid in-
ference.
(5) a. If not p, then not q.
b. Not p.
———
c. Not q.
The not p in (5a) cannot indicate the rejection of p, since somebody uttering
(5a) might assent to p. Thus, the not in (5a) must modify the proposition p instead
of expressing an attitude towards it. Suppose we insist that in unembedded
contexts such as (5b) not p expresses dissent towards p. Then, the content of
(5b) does not coincide with the antecedent of (5a), and (5) cannot be validated
by modus ponens. For the inference to be an instance of modus ponens, the not in
(5b) must modify p. But then it cannot express dissent.
The bilateralist solution is straightforward: not is a compositional operator
and hencemodifies p in both (5a) and (5b), so (5) is just a case ofmodus ponens. The
bilateralist account is still expressivist because although not is a compositional
operator, it is inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of rejection, which
expresses the attitude of dissent.
More generally, the bilateralist takes the meaning of any compositional op-
erator to be given by its introduction and elimination rules; but, she contends,
adequate meaning-conferring rules for negation must be framed in terms of
conditions on rejection as well as assertion. For instance, bilateral systems
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WEAK ASSERTION 7
include a rule allowing one to pass from the assertion of not p to the rejection
of p.
Thus, according to our preferred understanding of bilateralism, the connec-
tion between the meaning of the logical constants and speech acts is inferential.
For this reason, bilateralism is best regarded as an instance of inferential expres-
sivism, the view that the meaning of an expression is explained in terms of its
inferential connections to speech acts expressing attitudes.
Mixed inferences and Frege–Geach. Recall that the bilateralist takes no to indicate
rejection. This means that no and not have different functions: the former is
a force-indicator, the latter is a compositional operator. Nonetheless, no and
not inferentially interact: the rules for not are formulated using the speech act
indicated by no. Hence, no can be used to inferentially explain the meaning of
not.
However, taking no to be a force-indicator gives rise to a revenge version
of the Frege–Geach argument. Consider the following inference involving
yes-or-no answers to polar questions.
(6) a. Is it the case that if not p, then not q? Yes!
b. Is it the case that p? No!
———
c. Is it the case that q? No!
Intuitively, (6) is valid. As before, not in (6a) must modify the proposition p, but
(6b) is taken to express dissent from p via the use of the force-indicator no.
Thus, (6) cannot be validated by modus ponens unless no in (6b) also modifies p
to not p, in which case it is not a force-indicator.
However, to validate (6) one need not consider it a direct application of
modus ponens (Smiley 1996). Instead, the inference can be validated by taking
it to involve an additional inferential step from rejection to negative asser-
tion (Rumfitt 2000) or different inferential machinery altogether (Incurvati &
Schlo¨der 2017).
According to bilateralists, the inference (6) is mixed in that it involves both
assertion and rejection. Examples of other intuitively valid mixed inferences
are not hard to come by.
(7) a. Is it the case that if p, then q? Yes!
b. Is it the case that q? No!
———
c. Is it the case that p? No!
Someone who identifies rejection with negative assertion would consider this
inference a case of modus tollens. But one need not theorise about negation
and its relation to rejection to recognize (7) as valid. The bilateralist, for her
part, can account for mixed inferences such as (7) by coordinating assertion and
rejection.
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8 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
To this end, note that if one asserted and rejected the same content, one
would be both assenting and dissenting from that content. But this is absurd,
since assent and dissent are incompatible attitudes. This sanctions the following
coordination principles.
• Rejection principle: It is absurd to both assert and reject p.
• Smileian reductio: If it is absurd for someone to assert p that must be
because they were already committed to rejecting p; and if it is absurd for
someone to reject p, that must be because they were already committed
to asserting p.
We will clarify the role of commitment and give a detailed justification of
these principles in Section V, when implementing them in the formal system
developed there. For now, note that using these principles one can explain the
validity of (7). For suppose that someone asserts if p then q and rejects q. The
fact that they have asserted if p then q means that should they also assert p
they would be committed, via modus ponens, to asserting q. But the Rejection
principle tells us that this would be absurd, given that they have rejected
q. By Smileian reductio, we conclude that they were already committed to
rejecting p.
This explanation of the validity of (7) uses theRejection principle.Onemight
therefore worry that whilst solving the conditional version of the Frege–Geach
problem, inferential expressivism falls prey to its negation version (Unwin 1999;
Schroeder 2008a). For in using the Rejection principle, inferential expressivism
seems to assume that assent and dissent are incompatible. But this cannot be
assumed: it needs to be explained.
Here is an outline of our response, developed in ongoing work. It is com-
monplace to explain the incompatibility of assent and dissent from p on the
basis of the inconsistency of p and not p (perhaps in turn explained on the basis
of a basic incompatibility between truth and falsity). Inferential expressivism
reverses this order of explanation: it is the incompatibility of assent and dissent
from p which explains the inconsistency of p and not p.
On this account, the incompatibility of assent and dissent is basic. But
this is no reason to fault inferential expressivism, just as one should not fault
the standard approach for taking the inconsistency of p and not p as basic or
explaining it on the basis of a fundamental incompatibility between truth and
falsity.
This is not to say that one cannot provide reasons for thinking that assent and
dissent are incompatible. In particular, these attitudes are intimately connected
with the speech acts expressing them. It is therefore possible to infer properties
of assent and dissent from the way assertion and rejection are interpreted. And
a speaker answering positively and negatively to the same polar question is
normally taken to have changed their mind, on pain of incoherence.
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WEAK ASSERTION 9
Beyond the core logical constants. Inferential expressivism retains the appeal of ex-
pressivism whilst avoiding the pitfalls of its traditional versions. In particular,
inferential expressivism takes the meaning of certain expressions to be suitably
grounded in attitudes while providing a natural solution to the Frege–Geach
problem. As a form of inferentialism, however, it must address a major chal-
lenge faced by inferentialist approaches to meaning: to account for a wide
range of expressions and not only the core logical constants (i.e., the connec-
tives, the quantifiers, and identity).
We take a step towards meeting this challenge by presenting an inferential
expressivist account of might. This account takes might to be a compositional
operator inferentially explained in terms of the speech act of weak assertion.
As we shall argue, weak assertion can be performed using perhaps in certain
suitable contexts. Thus, just as a bilateralist explains not in terms of no, we
explain might in terms of perhaps.
IV. WEAK ASSERTION
It is widely agreed that might must modify content because of its embeddability
behaviour (von Fintel & Gillies 2007; Swanson 2010; MacFarlane 2014). We
concur, but it does not follow that every piece of epistemic vocabulary modifies
content. Indeed, we will now present linguistic data in support of the claim
that perhaps is a force-modifier, i.e., its occurrence in an utterance modifies the
speech act that would otherwise be performed with that utterance, but not its
content. Analogous data could be presented in defence of the view that maybe
is a force-modifier, but we restrict attention to perhaps.
perhaps and might. It seems that perhaps and might have been conflated at times.
For instance, Benjamin Schnieder (2010) uses examples involving perhaps to
comment on Yalcin’s puzzles about might, and Joshua Crabill (2013) makes use
of Schnieder’s insights, but replaces perhaps with might again. At first glance,
perhaps and might are rather similar, aside from some syntactic differences.
(8) a. Perhaps it is raining.
b. It might be raining.
(8a) and (8b) can be justifiably uttered in exactly the same circumstances. We
take this to show that they are inferentially equivalent, i.e in a fixed context,
the same inferences can be drawn from an utterance of (8a) and an utterance
of (8b). Moreover, perhaps and might both lead to Yalcin’s puzzle.
(9) #a. Suppose it is raining and perhaps it is not raining.
#b. Suppose it is raining and it might not be raining.
Schnieder (2010) seeks to explain (9a) as a special case of the fact that perhaps
does not embed under suppose at all.
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10 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
(10) # Suppose perhaps it is raining.
(10) sounds rather odd. Hence, Schnieder argues, it is not surprising that (9a)
sounds odd as well. Schnieder takes the fact that perhaps fails to embed under
suppose to provide evidence that its function is to express an attitude. This is in
agreement with what we argue below.
But what does this mean for might? To start with, the fact that Perhaps it is
raining and It might be raining are inferentially equivalent does not mean that
might and perhaps have identical embedding behaviour. For instance, while (10)
is infelicitous, (11) appears to be fine.
(11) Suppose it might be raining.
Crabill (2013) claims that (11) is infelicitous, but we suspect this is due to his
identification of might with perhaps. Here are two natural cases of embeddings
of might under suppose.
(12) a. Biologists supposed it might be a gene like the one causing Burkitt’s
lymphoma that made cells lose control of their proliferation ...
(The NewYork Times,Geneticists’ Target: Immortal Cells, 22December 1992)
b. The standard model ... is presumably closer to the truth about funda-
mental particles than [earlier theories]. At least, it makes sense to suppose
that it might be.
(Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Truthlikeness, Oddie 2016)
These examples provide evidence that (11) is generally acceptable. It follows
that Schnieder and Crabill cannot solve Yalcin’s puzzle. For if their strategy to
explain the infelicity of (9a) applied to (9b) as well, (11) should be as infelicitous
as (10).
Moreover, perhaps does not embed in conditional antecedents, whereas might
does.
(13) #a. If perhaps it is raining, I’d better take an umbrella.
b. If it might be raining, I’d better take an umbrella.
Finally, Eric Swanson (2010) argues against expressivist treatments of might by
observing that it embeds under quantifiers. In this respect too, perhaps differs
from might.
(14) a. Every day it might be raining.
#b. Every day perhaps it is raining.
Because of its embedding behaviour, perhaps is sometimes taken to belong to
the category of speaker-oriented adverbs like frankly, fortunately, or evidently, which
speakers use to comment on their utterances (Mittwoch 1977; Bellert 1977;
Ernst 2009).
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WEAK ASSERTION 11
However, it is not correct to say that perhaps is used to comment on the
performance of a speech act. If one says frankly p, fortunately p, or evidently p,
all the effects of asserting p still obtain, but this is not the case for perhaps p.
For instance, on a commitment account of assertion (Brandom 1983), uttering
frankly p commits one to p, and on a knowledge norm account (Williamson
2000), uttering frankly p requires one to know that p. But if one says perhaps p,
one is not thereby committed to p or required to know that p.
Moreover, speaker-oriented adverbs cannot co-occur. For instance, frankly
fortunately it is raining and fortunately evidently it is raining sound bad. However,
speaker-oriented adverbs can co-occur with perhaps. Here are two examples.
(15) a. Frankly, perhaps Route 4 isn’t what Ms. Milby needs to investigate.
(TheWashington Post, Commuter Advice From Several Directions, 6December
2001)
b. Frankly it’s perhaps now too late.
(BBC, George Low stabbing: Cyprus murder suspect ‘set free’. 6 July 2017)
Thus, perhaps fits with neither speaker-oriented adverbs (such as frankly) nor
compositional operators (like might). But there is a third option. Whilst frankly
is used to comment on the performance of a speech act, perhaps is used to modify
the speech act performed. Hence, in (15b), frankly serves to comment on the
performance of the speech act obtained by modifying with perhaps an assertion
of it’s now too late.
One might object that perhaps cannot be a force-modifier because it embeds
in conditional consequents.
(16) If it is going to rain, perhaps we should stay in.
However, such an embedding is compatible with perhaps not being a composi-
tional operator. For instance, frankly also embeds in this way.
(17) If it is going to rain, frankly we should stay in.
But nobody would conclude that frankly is not a speech act adverb. Instead,
conditionals such as (17) are best analysed as conditional performances of speech
acts (Edgington 1995; Schnieder 2010). This is compatible with the occurrence
of a force-modifying expression in the consequent of (16): perhaps modifies the
speech act that is being conditionally performed.
perhaps as a force-modifier. Our evidence for perhaps being a force-modifier is the
following: (i) perhaps exhibits the embedding behaviour that one would expect
of a particle operating exclusively at the speech act level; (ii) the role of perhaps
cannot be reduced to that of commenting on one’s performance of a speech
act; (iii) in polar questions, perhaps appears not to modify the core proposition;
(iv) in commands, perhaps appears to modify force.
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12 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
We have illustrated (i) and (ii) and now turn to (iii) and (iv). First, consider a
natural use of perhaps in a polar question.
(18) Is it perhaps [made of] resin?
(British National Corpus, file KCV, line 4908)
Examining the potential positive answers to the question in (18) reveals that
perhaps does not modify its core proposition.
(19) a. Is it perhaps resin?
b. Yes, it is.
?c. Yes, perhaps it is.
#d. Yes, but perhaps it is something else.
If perhaps were to modify the core proposition in (18), the appropriate positive
answer to (19a) would be (19c). But the proper answer is (19b).2 Moreover, (19d)
indicates that yes here targets it is resin, since it cannot be felicitously followed
by perhaps it is something else (whereas perhaps it is resin could be). We conclude
that perhaps in (19a) affects the question’s force, but not its content: it seems to
make it a biased (Bellert 1977) or tentative question instead of a neutral polar
question.
What about uses of might in polar questions? If might is a compositional
operator, we should expect it to modify a question’s core proposition. This
prediction appears to be borne out.
(20) a. Might it be resin?
?b. Yes, it is.
c. Yes, it might be.
d. Yes, but it might be something else.
The preferred answer to the question in (20a) seems (20c).3 This indicates that
the question concerns a core proposition modified by might. Accordingly, (20d)
is felicitous: if yes targets it might be resin, it should be compatible with it might be
something else, as is indeed the case.
Now, consider an utterance in imperative mood containing perhaps and
contrast it with the same utterance without perhaps.
(21) Perhaps check with the Seahawks.
(The New York Times, Seahawks Beckon, and U.S.C. Cringes, 8 January 2010)
(22) Check with the Seahawks.
These two utterances seem to express the same content, but with different forces:
(22) is a command, whereas (21) seems more of a suggestion. Thus, in (21)
perhaps appears to modify force.
2 While (19c) does not strike us as downright infelicitous, it appears to bemockery by repetition.
The appropriate answer using perhaps appears to be I don’t know—perhaps it is.
3 Again, (20b) is not downright infelicitous, but it seems to overanswer the question.
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WEAK ASSERTION 13
We conclude that perhaps modifies force rather than content. It modifies
polar questions to biased or tentative questions and commands to suggestions,
and has an analogous function when applied to assertions.
Now recall Smiley’s suggestion that an assertion can be realised by posing a
question to oneself and answering yes, as in (23a): perhaps can be used to modify
such an answer, as in (23b), so as to perform the speech act we call weak assertion.
For clarity’s sake, we will henceforth call strong assertion what is usually referred
to as assertion.
(23) a. Is it raining? Yes.
b. Is it raining? Perhaps yes.
(24) a. Perhaps it is raining.
b. Is it raining? Perhaps.
The forms in (24) are linguistic variants of (23b): in (24a), it is raining would
otherwise be a strong assertion, but perhaps modifies this to a weak assertion;
(24b) is like (23b) with an elided yes.
Thus, (23b), (24a), and (24b) all serve to perform the weak assertion of it
is raining. This is a different speech act than the strong assertion of it might
be raining. There is, however, a close connection between might and perhaps: as
mentioned, they seem interchangeable in non-embedded contexts. Thismeans
that the weak assertion of it is raining and the strong assertion of it might be raining
are inferentially equivalent. In what follows, we shall exploit this inferential
equivalence to give an account of might in terms of weak assertion.4
Weak and strong assertion. We have gathered evidence for the existence of the
speech act of weak assertion, but still need to explain what this speech act is.
To this end, consider Stalnaker’s model of conversation (Stalnaker 1978,
2002). According to this model, conversation takes place against a backdrop
of shared presuppositions, the common ground. In Stalnaker’s view, the essential
effect of an assertion is a proposal to update the common ground. Such a
proposal may be accepted by all conversation participants, in which case the
common ground is updated accordingly. However, not every update proposal
is acceptable to all conversation participants. So any complete account of how
the common ground is managed must include a mechanism by which to prevent
such an update.
The speech act of weak rejection provides such a mechanism. Updating the
common ground requires unanimous assent. But since assent and dissent
4 Our linguistic observations about perhaps also seem to apply to probably. We conjecture that
one can give a force-modifier analysis of probably and explain probability operators such as likely
in terms of probably. One issue is that probabilistic adjectives come in all sort of degrees, but this
aspect might be dealt with by augmenting the logic developed below with a theory of probability,
inferentially grounded. We leave this to future work.
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14 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
are incompatible attitudes, a weak rejection of p indicates that there is not
unanimous assent to p. So, by performing a weak rejection, one prevents a
common ground update (Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017). Of course, one might
also attempt to prevent an update with p by asserting something that excludes
assent to p, e.g., not p. But then something more than preventing the update has
happened. Thus, it would be mistaken to dispense with weak rejection because
one has negative assertion.
To see where weak assertion fits into this model of conversation, consider
the following dialogue, which is based on an example of Paul Grice (1991, 82)
and which in (Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017) we presented as a case involving a
weak rejection.
(25) Alice: X or Y will win the election.
Bob: No, X or Y or Z will win.
Bob is here dissenting from both X or Y will win and neither X nor Y will win.
Dissent from X or Y will win is expressed with the particle no, as per the
bilateralist account. By contrast, dissent from neither X nor Y will win is conveyed
via a pragmatic implicature: if Bob had not intended to dissent, he would have
explicitly assented to Z will win. Indeed, this implicature can be cancelled.
(26) Alice: X or Y will win the election.
Bob: No, X or Y or Z will win. In fact, Z will.
We argue that weak assertion is the mechanism by which one can express dissent
from neither X nor Y will win. Compare (27), where this effect of uttering perhaps—
that one is dissenting from neither X nor Y will win—is non-cancellable.
(27) Perhaps X or Y will win the election. #In fact, neither of them will.
Thus, weakly asserting X or Y will win excludes assent to the negative of X or Y
will win (and nothing more). That is, the essential effect of the weak assertion
of p is to exclude the strong assertion of not p or, equivalently, exclude the strong
rejection of p. (Recall that the strong assertion of not p is inferentially equivalent
to the strong rejection of p.) Hence, just as the purpose of weak rejection is to
exclude strong assertion (expressing assent), weak assertion works to exclude
strong rejection (expressing assent to a negative).
This gives us four speech acts with the corresponding essential effects. By
performing one of these speech acts, the speaker takes a public stance on the
admissibility of a proposition into the common ground.
• By strongly asserting p, one proposes to add p to the common ground
(or accepts a previous proposal to this effect).
• By strongly rejecting, p one proposes to add not p to the common ground
(or accepts a previous proposal to this effect).
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• By weakly asserting p, one prevents not p from being added to the
common ground.
• By weakly rejecting p, one prevents p from being added to the common
ground.
Jointly, these speech acts allow precise management of what is accepted into
the common ground.
It is worth comparing this analysis of perhaps with some data about might.
It has been observed that might can be used to reject a negative (Khoo 2015;
Bledin & Rawlins forthcoming).
(28) Alex: It is not raining.
Becky: (No,) it might be.
Our analysis straightforwardly explains this piece of data. For the strong as-
sertion of it might be raining is inferentially equivalent to the weak assertion of it
is raining, which excludes assent to it is not raining. Hence, (28) is predicted to be
a rejection move.
One might object that might can also be used to reject the positive it is raining.
(29) Alex: It is raining.
Becky: (No,) it might be.
However, the rejection in (29) is pragmatic: might conversationally implicates not
surely, just as some in (30) implicates not all (Khoo 2015; Schlo¨der & Ferna´ndez
2015). This is evinced by the fact that these implicatures can be cancelled as
in (31). Thus, (29) should not be mistaken as evidence regarding the semantic
contribution of might.
(30) Alex: Alicia ate all the cookies.
Becky: (No,) she ate some cookies.
(31) a. She ate some cookies—in fact, she ate all of them!
b. It might be raining—in fact, it is raining!
might and the Frege–Geach problem. We mentioned earlier that traditional expres-
sivist analyses of might are generally taken to be undermined by its embed-
dability behaviour. One way to appreciate this point is to observe that the
embeddability of might under conditional antecedents can be used to run a
version of the Frege–Geach argument (von Fintel & Gillies 2007; MacFarlane
2014).
(32) a. If might p, then might q.
b. might p.
———
c. might q.
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16 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
Since this inference appears to be valid, the Frege–Geach argument can be
performed as usual to establish that might in (32b) must modify content. In-
ferential expressivism takes might to be a compositional operator and hence
sees (32) as a straightforward application of modus ponens, thereby avoiding this
instance of the Frege–Geach problem.
We argued, however, that perhaps is a force-modifier. This gives rise to a
revenge version of the Frege–Geach argument, just as taking no to be a force-
indicator did. Consider:
(33) a. If might p, then might q.
b. Perhaps p.
———
c. Perhaps q.
This argument seems valid. Now on our account perhaps in (33b) does not
modify p, whereas might in the antecedent of (33a) does. But then (33) is not an
instance of modus ponens, and our account, it seems, cannot validate it.
Similarly to when we discussed not, this argument rests on the assumption
that (33) must be a direct application of modus ponens. But we can validate (33)
using, besides modus ponens, the fact that the weak assertion of p is inferentially
equivalent to the strong assertion of might p. In particular, from the weak
assertion of p (performed uttering Perhaps p), we can infer the strong assertion
of might p. This, together with the strong assertion of if might p, then might q
delivers, by modus ponens, the strong assertion of might q and hence the weak
assertion of q.
The inference (33) involves weak and strong assertion, and is therefore
mixed. When considering no and rejection, we presented a mixed inference
which can be recognized as valid without theorising about embeddable oper-
ators. One can find analogous cases involving perhaps.
(34) a. If p, then q.
b. Perhaps p.
———
c. Perhaps q.
This inference cannot be validated simply by appealing to the inferential
equivalence between perhaps p and might p. To validate this inference, one
needs to coordinate strong and weak assertion, similarly to what happened in
the case of strong assertion and weak rejection. We will show how to do this
below.
From bilateralism to multilateralism. Bilateralism takes the meaning of the logical
constants to be given by conditions on strong assertion andweak rejection. We argue
that bilateralism should be extended to multilateralism by encompassing weak
assertion. In the next section, we codify conditions on weak assertion, strong
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assertion, and weak rejection in a multilateral logic. These conditions give the
meaning of not and might.
Weak assertion is therefore more basic than not and might: the basic speech
acts of common ground management are prior to any embeddable operator.
However, our logic does not include a sign for strong rejection, since the three
other speech acts suffice to explain not, and a strong rejection is equivalent
to the assertion of a negation. But we are not committed to identifying strong
rejection with negative assertion, and one could introduce a sign for strong
rejection via rules allowing one to pass from a strong rejection to a negative
assertion and vice versa.
V. MULTILATERAL LOGIC FOR EPISTEMIC MODALITY
Our multilateral logic is cast in a language with constants ∧,¬,♦, and →,
formalizing and, not, might, and conditionals.5 We use upper-case letters to
denote sentences and prefix them with force-markers: + for strong assertion, 
for weak rejection, and ⊕ for weak assertion. We give our inference rules in a
natural deduction calculus. In the interest of brevity, we present a minimal set
of rules for ∧, ¬, →, and ♦. The remaining cases can be derived using the
rules provided.
Inference. We should first clarify what we mean by inference in the context of in-
ferential expressivism. The immediate explanation is that inference preserves
attitude: some attitudes towards some propositions require further attitudes to-
wards further propositions.While intuitive, this explanation requires additional
clarification.
Suppose we validate the inference from +A to +B . Surely this does not
mean that whoever strongly asserts A also strongly asserts B (Dutilh Novaes
2015). In terms of attitudes, it is implausible to say that whoever assents to A
also assents to B (see Restall 2005). For assent requires awareness of what is
being assented to, but infinitely many propositions follow from any given A,
and nobody can be said to have assented to them all.
Restall’s problem can be avoided by taking +B to follow from +A just in
case whoever strongly asserts A is committed to assenting to B. To be committed to
assenting to B does not require being aware of B. Rather, it requires assenting
to B once this is pointed out.
For instance, suppose a speaker strongly asserts both if A, then B and A, but
does not assent to B. In this situation, the speaker is nonetheless required to
assent to B once this is pointed out to them—or admit to a mistake and retract an
5 As noted when discussing conditional performances of speech acts, not all natural language
occurrences of if ...then correspond to an embeddable operator. In ongoing work, we further
investigate which natural language if ...then are formalised by our →, but we set the issue aside
here.
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18 INCURVATI AND SCHLO¨DER
earlier assertion (Brandom 1983; MacFarlane 2010). This is what we mean by
being committed to assenting to a proposition.
This attitude-theoretic account of inference sanctions the bilateral rules for
asserted conjunction.
+A +B(+∧I.) +(A ∧ B )
+(A ∧ B )
(+∧E.1) +A
+(A ∧ B )
(+∧E.2) +B
A speaker who strongly asserts A and strongly asserts B is committed to as-
senting to A and B. Similarly, someonewho strongly asserts A and B is committed
to assenting to A and B individually.
The account is similar to Catarina Dutilh Novaes’s (2015) proposal that if
B follows from A and you have granted A, you are required to grant B. To be
required to grant B does not mean to have granted B—rather to do so once B is
put forward. The notion of granting, however, is married to assertion, whereas
we aim to validate inferences also involving rejections and weak assertions.
Thus, we prefer to speak of being committed to having certain attitudes. This
follows Incurvati & Schlo¨der (2017). There we explain implicit assent as implicit
commitment in the context of a commitment account of assertion (Brandom 1983,
1994; Lascarides & Asher 2009), but generalize that account by encompassing
attitudes other than assent.
The attitude-theoretic account can be used to validate inferences involving
the other speech acts we are concerned with. For instance, it sanctions as valid
the inference (7) discussed earlier, which has it that if one asserts if A then B and
rejects B, one is committed to dissenting from A.
In what follows, we give inference rules that are justified in that they preserve
the attitudes one is committed to having. Thus, our logic computes which atti-
tudes a single speaker is committed to, given the attitudes they have displayed.
In speech act terms, our logic computes which stances on what is admissible
into the common ground a speaker is committed to, given the stances they
have publicly taken.
Bilateral coordination principles. In Section III we described two principles coor-
dinating assertion and rejection. Using ⊥ as a sign for absurdity, we can now
formalize these principles.6
+A A(Rejection) ⊥
(Rejection) expresses the idea that it is absurd to both strongly assert and
weakly reject the same proposition, i.e., +A and A are incompatible. This
is a central property of strong assertion and weak rejection as the speech acts
expressing the incompatible attitudes of assent and dissent (Dickie 2010).
6 As usual in bilateral systems, ⊥ is considered a punctuation mark and is therefore not
prefixed by a force-marker (Tennant 1999; Rumfitt 2000).
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The justification for the two halves of Smileian reductio goes as follows.
[+A ]
...
⊥(SR1) A
[A ]
...
⊥(SR2) +A
The conditional proof in (SR1) says that strongly asserting A leads to absurdity.
This means that the speaker is committed to having an attitude towards A
that is incompatible with assent to A. That is, A is unassertible to the speaker.
Since to dissent is to find a proposition unassertible, it follows that the speaker
is committed to dissenting from A. The converse argument justifies (SR2): if
rejecting A leads to absurdity, the speaker is committed to having an attitude
that excludes dissent from A. This attitude must be assent to A.
Recall that besides expressing attitudes, assertion and rejection also serve
to negotiate common ground updates. When read focusing on this role, (SR1)
says that if it is absurd for someone to propose a common ground update, that
must be because their public stances on what is admissible into the common
ground already commit them to preventing that update. Similarly, (SR2) states
that if it is absurd for someone to prevent a proposed update of the common
ground with p, that must be because their public stances on what is admissible
into the common ground already commit them to accepting a proposal to
add p.
might and not. We now turn to the rules for ♦. As argued in Section IV, when
might and perhaps take scope over the same non-embedded clause, they can be
interchanged without affecting the inferential meaning of the sentence. Thus,
♦s can be introduced by moving from weak to strong assertion, and can be
eliminated symmetrically.
⊕A(+♦I.) +♦A
+♦A(+♦E.) ⊕A
Two additional rules for ♦ account for the fact that perhaps it might be raining is
inferentially equivalent to perhaps it is raining.
⊕A(⊕♦I.) ⊕♦A
⊕♦A(⊕♦E.) ⊕A
These rules imply that iterating might does not affect the compositional content
of an utterance (see also Yalcin 2007; Willer 2013). However, this only applies
when the context does not indicate that multiple occurrences of might are to
be understood with reference to different common grounds. A case based on
(DeRose 1991, 584–5) will clarify the situation. A medical test has been run
but the results are not known yet. A negative result rules out John having the
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disease; a positive result leaves that possibility open. Responding to a friend
asking for information, John’s partner Jane says:
Answer-1. We haven’t got the results yet. It might be the case that John might have the
disease. We’ll know whether he might have it when we get the results.
Jane asserts that it might be the case that John might have the disease but seems
unwilling to assert that John might have the disease. This answer seems entirely
appropriate. However, it seems equally appropriate for Jane to assert that John
might have the disease (DeRose 1991, 583).
Answer-2. John might have the disease. He has some of the symptoms. We won’t get
the test results until tomorrow.
In Answer-2, it is clear that might is to be understood with reference to the
current common ground cgc. This suggests that in Answer-1 Jane is unwilling
to assert that John might have the disease because this occurrence of might is
understood with reference to a different common ground. Since the fact that
the common ground will be updated with the test results is very salient, this
is naturally taken to be cga, the common ground after the results are known.
Thus, in Answer-1, Jane asserts that it mightcgc be that John mightcga have the disease.
In so doing, she prevents frommaking it common ground that, once the results
are known, she will prevent from making it common ground that John does not
have the disease. This seems a correct reading of her utterance and does not
imply that John mightcga have the disease, even in the presence of the ⊕♦ rules.
The next rules give the meaning of negation. In Section IV we argued that
the essential effect of the weak assertion of A is to exclude assent to ¬A, which
is the same essential effect as that of the weak rejection of ¬A. Accordingly,
⊕A and ¬A are inferentially equivalent. Analogous arguments show that
weakly asserting a negative is inferentially equivalent to rejecting the positive.
Thus we also have rules allowing us to pass from ⊕¬A to A and vice versa.
⊕A(¬I.) ¬A
¬A(¬E.) ⊕A
A(⊕¬I.) ⊕¬A
⊕¬A(⊕¬E.) A
The rules for ♦ and ¬ are obviously in harmony, since the elimination rules
are the direct inverses of the introduction rules. Hence, these rules confer a
coherent meaning on might and not.
Conditionals and the specificity problem. Formulating the rules for → requires some
care. In (Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017) we argue that the Deduction principle
ought to fail in bilateral logics in which rejections are weak due to the specificity
problem (implicit in Dickie 2010). Consider the principle of classical negation
introduction (CNI) and compare it with the also classically valid (CR).
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[+A ]
...
⊥(CNI) +¬A
+(A → (B ∧ ¬B ))
(CR) +¬A
As Dickie (2010) observes, (CNI) must fail in bilateral logics in which rejections
are weak. For the conditional proof in (CNI) establishes that asserting A leads
to absurdity, i.e. that A is dissented from, whilst the conclusion of (CNI) says
that ¬A is assented to. But assenting to a negative is only one way of expressing
dissent. Thus, (CNI) reduces all possible ways of dissenting from a proposition
to assent to its negation. That is, (CNI) allows one to go from unspecific dissent
to a specific way of dissenting, viz. assent to a negative. Therefore, (CNI) does
not preserve attitude and is therefore not valid.
We can make things more concrete by presenting an invalid natural lan-
guage instantiation of (CNI), using an example already encountered. Consider
a situation in which one dissents from the proposition b that X or Y will win the
election but assents to the proposition c that X or Y or Z will win. If one were to
assent to the proposition a that Z will lose the election, one would hold incompat-
ible attitudes. Formally, b,+c ,+a 	 ⊥. By (CNI), it would follow that one is
committed to assenting to the proposition ¬a that Z will not lose the election. But
this is a mistake, since one may also dissent from ¬a, if, say, one ascribes equal
chances to all the candidates.
However, (CR) is not similarly defective. It states that ¬A can be inferred
from assent to a determinate, specific piece of information, viz. the proposition
that any situation in which A holds is a contradictory situation. In the above
example, assent to Z will lose the election leads to absurdity, but this does not
entail assent to if Z will lose, there is a contradiction. Thus, the premiss of (CR)
is logically stronger than the conditional proof in (CNI) because it is more
informative. Hence, in particular, (CR) is a weaker principle than (CNI).
But then the Deduction principle (+ →I.) must fail in bilateral logics.
[+A ]
...
+B(+→I.) +(A → B )
Since Smileian reductio encodes a form of explosion, the conditional proof in
(CNI) entails +A · · · + (B ∧ ¬B ). Given (+ →I.), we could then obtain the
premiss of (CR). Hence (CR) would entail (CNI)—but this is a mistake, since
we determined (CR) to be strictly weaker than (CNI). Thus, (+ →I.) is invalid.
In (Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017) we deal with the issue by restricting (+ →I.) to
derivations that exclusively employ strongly asserted premisses. Let us write +
...
for a subderivation which only uses premisses marked by + and in which all
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remaining undischarged assumptions are also marked with +. Then, we can
formulate our earlier restriction of (+ →I.) as follows:
[+A ]
+
...
+B(+→I.*) +(A → B )
Since the language of our earlier system only includes the standard Boolean
connectives, this solves the problem: in such a language, the only way to
express dissent from A by only strong assertion is to assent to the negation of
A or to the fact that A entails an absurdity. Thus, (+ →I.*) derives no more
instances of (CNI) from (CR) than are already validated by (CR): whenever
one derives dissent from A from only asserted Boolean premisses, the attitudes
one is committed to already amount to the premiss or the conclusion of (CR)
(Incurvati & Schlo¨der 2017).
This solution will not do in the current situation, since epistemic vocabulary
adds a new way of expressing dissent by means of a strong assertion, namely
+♦¬A . This is a strong assertion which is sufficient to infer dissent from A,
but it amounts to neither asserting that A is false nor that A entails an absurdity.
To solve the problem posed by epistemic vocabulary, we further restrict
(+ →I.). Deriving dissent from A (i.e. A ) from +♦¬A requires eliminating a
♦. We exclude such derivations from the Deduction principle.
[+A ]
+
...
+B(+→I.**) if (+♦E.) and (⊕♦E.) were not used to derive +B .+(A → B )
In effect, this restriction ensures that epistemic grounds to dissent are elimi-
nated from the Deduction principle.
The usual bilateral version of (+ →E.) remains valid in our logic and is
in harmony with (+ →I.**) according to the levelling peak criterion (Dummett
1991).7
+(A → B ) +A
(+→E.) +B
7 A peak is an application of an introduction rule immediately followed by the corresponding
elimination rule. To level a peak is to eliminate the successive introduction/elimination. A peak
for → can be levelled by applying the derivation of +B from +A in (+→I.**) to the minor
premiss +A of (+→E.).The rules for strongly asserted → are, as they stand, not harmonious
according to the general elimination harmony criterion (Read 2000). However, one can obtain
a version of (+→E.) which is general-elimination harmonious with (+→I.**) by imposing the
restriction of (+→I.**) on +A in (+→E.). All results in this paper still go through under this
restriction.
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Multilateral coordination principles.The principles (Rejection) and Smileian reductio
coordinate strong assertion and rejection. But our logic includes a force-marker
for weak assertion. To properly integrate this speech act into the logic, we
give two additional coordination principles. Our first coordination principle
guarantees that strong assertion is a special case of weak assertion.
+A(Assertion) ⊕A
The weak assertion of A excludes assent to¬A. (Assertion) ensures that so does
the strong assertion of A.
Our second coordination principle says that weak assertion is preserved
under entailment.
[+A ]
+
...
+B ⊕A(Weak Inference) if (+♦E.) and (⊕♦E.) were not used to⊕B
derive +B .
How can (Weak Inference) be justified? By Smileian reductio, the derivation of
+B from+A means that assent to not B entails dissent from A. And the premiss
⊕A excludes assent to not A. Thus, if it were absurd to exclude assent to not A
whilst dissenting from A, we could conclude that assent to not B is excluded.
That is, we could conclude⊕B , as desired. But it is plainly not absurd to exclude
assent to not A whilst dissenting from A. To wit:
(35) Is it raining? Perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. #It is.
In this example, assent to not A is excluded, but so is assent to A, which is
therefore dissented from. A weak assertion of A excludes assent to not A, i.e. it
excludes a specific way of dissenting from A. However, it does not exclude general
dissent from A, such as that expressed through a weak rejection of A or assent
to might not A.
Hence, to be able to conclude ⊕B in (Weak Inference), we must have that
assent to not B entails specific dissent from A. Formally, this is obtained by
restricting the subderivation in (Weak Inference) in the same way as we did
with the Deduction principle.
In Section III, we noticed that coordination principles help validate mixed
inferences. Crucially, this is the case for (Weak Inference). In particular, recall
the following inference involving strong and weak assertion.
(36) a. If p, then q.
b. Perhaps p.
———
c. Perhaps q.
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This inference is immediately validated once (Weak Inference) is added to
our logic.
Epistemic multilateral logic. This concludes the exposition of the rules of our
logic. That is, we let epistemic multilateral logic be the natural deduction calculus
consisting of the three rules for ∧, the four coordination principles, the eight
rules for ♦ and ¬, and the two rules for →, viz. (+ →E.) and (+ →I.**). As
we show in a technical companion to this paper (Incurvati and Schlo¨der ms),
the logic is consistent, since it can be proved sound (and indeed complete) for
an embedding into the modal logic S5.
Epistemic multilateral logic preserves the bilateralist defence of classical
negation.
Proposition V.I. The following are theorems of epistemic multilateral logic:
• +(A → ¬¬A ).
• +(¬¬A → A ).
• +((A → B ) → (¬B → ¬A )).
Proofs are in the Appendix. Now it is easy to check that (+ →I.**) and (+ →E.)
jointly entail the standard axioms for →.8 Together with Proposition V.I, this
delivers Frege’s axioms for the classical propositional calculus. Moreover, one
can show that A∧B with ∧ characterized by (+∧I.) and (+∧E.) is equivalent
to ¬(A → ¬B).
Therefore, the logic of strongly asserted content extends classical logic: on strongly
asserted premisses we have all classical theorems and classical modus ponens.
Thus we in fact validate classical inference: epistemic multilateral logic sanctions
as valid all classically valid arguments. This, nota bene, applies to all substitution-
instances of these arguments, including ones containing ♦s.
VI. RESOLVING THE EPISTEMIC PUZZLES
Epistemic multilateral logic is motivated independently of the epistemic puz-
zles described in Section II. We now show that it yields natural solutions to
those puzzles.
Yalcin’s puzzle. We explain Yalcin’s puzzle by showing that the sentence p and
it might not p gives rise to incompatible attitudes. The following derivation demon-
strates that assenting to p and it might not p immediately reduces to both assenting
and dissenting from p.
8 That is, +((A → (B → C )) → ((A → B ) → (A → C ))), +((A → (B → C )) → (B → (A →
C ))), and +(A → (B → A )).
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+(p ∧ ♦¬p )
(+∧E.)+p
+(p ∧ ♦¬p )
(+∧E.)+♦¬p
(+♦E.)⊕¬p
(⊕¬E.)p
(Rejection)⊥
Since assent and dissent are incompatible attitudes, to suppose that p and
it might not be p is to suppose something knowingly absurd. But apart from
indirect proof contexts, to suppose something knowingly absurd is incoherent.
As a result, suppose p and it might not be p is infelicitous.
Some may find suppose I assent to p and dissent from p less infelicitous (if
infelicitous at all) than suppose p and might not be p.9 This difference, we submit,
is due to the fact that in uttering I assent to p and dissent from p one is reporting
the fact that one assents and dissents from p, whereas uttering p and it might
not be p inferentially reduces to expressing assent and dissent from p. And while
expressing assent and dissent from the same proposition is absurd, it need not
be absurd to report that one both assents and dissents from it. As an analogy,
suppose that p and not p is infelicitous because p and not p express incompatible
attitudes, whereas suppose that I assent to p and assent to not p may sound more
felicitous because I assent to p and assent to not p merely reports that one has
incompatible attitudes.
It is worth comparing our explanation ofYalcin’s puzzle toMoore’s paradox.
It seems that one should not express assent to p without knowing p. This is, in
effect, the knowledge norm of assertion (Williamson 2000). However, it is not
absurd to express assent to p without knowing p. Accordingly, it is perfectly fine
to suppose that one has violated the norm, which explains the felicitousness of
Moore sentences under supposition.
In sum, according to our explanation, Yalcin’s puzzle is based on a conflict
of attitudes emerging from the semantic properties of might. This clearly distin-
guishes it from Moore’s paradox, which is based on a violation of a pragmatic
norm.
Triviality. Russell & Hawthorne (2016) prove their triviality result in a dynamic
setting, but epistemic multilateral logic is static. Nonetheless, one can repro-
duce in epistemic multilateral logic the crucial part of the triviality argument,
viz. the one showing that if a state is updated with might p, it rules out not p.
It becomes a proof that assent to not p and assent to might p are incompatible
attitudes.
9 We thank an anonymous referee for this observation.
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+¬p
+♦p
(+♦E.)⊕p
(¬I.)¬p
(Rejection)⊥
According to Russell andHawthorne’s argument, one can conclude that assent
to might p entails assent to p. This requires applying classical reductio (i.e. (CNI))
to derive +p from the fact that +¬p leads to absurdity. However, epistemic
multilateral logic does not sanction (CNI), although it validates a restricted
version thereof (proof in Appendix).
[+A ]
+
...
⊥(CNI*) if (+♦E.) and (⊕♦E.) were not used to derive ⊥.+¬A
But the derivation above eliminates a♦ and hence does not license application
of (CNI*). Indeed, there are models of epistemic multilateral logic in which
+♦p holds but+p does not (see Incurvati and Schlo¨der ms). So any purported
proof of +p from +♦p has to fail.
Thus, contra Russell and Hawthorne, rejecting Commutativity is not the
only real option once we accept that if a state is updated with not p, it rules out
might p. On our account, assent to not p and assent to might p are incompatible
attitudes (so, in dynamic terms, we do have that if a state is updated with might
p, it rules out not p). Yet, triviality is avoided: the culprit is the notion of entailment
used to conclude that assent to might p entails assent to p.
Modal disagreement. Our account explains the phenomenon of modal disagree-
ment. Consider again:
(37) Alice: I can’t find the keys.
Bob: They might be in the car.
Alice: No, they are not in the car. I just checked.
On our account, there is indeed a proposition that Bob is warranted in
asserting and Alice is warranted in rejecting, namely the proposition that the
keys might be in the car. This means that Alice and Bob’s disagreement is not
about some particular body of knowledge, but about whether not p should be
added to the common ground.
In particular, let p be the proposition that the keys are in the car. Then Bob
asserts might p, which is inferentially equivalent to the weak assertion of p.
Thus, he is committed to preventing not p from being added to the common
ground. Alice, on the other hand, thinks that not p should be added to the
common ground. As a result, she disagrees with Bob and rejects might p. This
is predicted by our logic, since ♦p is derivable from +¬p .
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VII. CONCLUSION
Traditional expressivism about might fails: because of its embeddability be-
haviour, might should be treated as a compositional operator. However, linguis-
tic analysis reveals that perhaps is a force-modifier, in line with what traditional
expressivists contend. In particular, in otherwise strongly assertoric contexts,
perhaps serves to perform the speech act of weak assertion. When embedded
into a multilateral logic, this speech act can be used to inferentially explain
the meaning of might. This vindicates inferential expressivism about epistemic
modality.
The resulting account of might has several attractive features. While ex-
pressivist, it solves the Frege–Geach problem. While inferentialist, it respects
harmony but retains classical logic as part of the logic of strongly asserted con-
tent. Finally, the account deals with the two problems we set out to address: it
provides a solution to the epistemic puzzles and, in so doing, demonstrates by
example that inferentialism can be fruitfully extended beyond the core logical
constants.
Inferentialism has often been associated with a revisionary approach to
logic. Our findings show that, when augmented with resources from the ex-
pressivist programme, it can in fact be used to preserve classical logic even
where current model-theoretic approaches typically recommend radical de-
partures from it.10
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of +(A → ¬¬A ) and +(¬¬A → A ).
[+A ]1
[¬¬A ]2
(¬E.)⊕¬A
(⊕¬E.)A
(Rejection)⊥
(SR2)2+¬¬A
(+→I.∗∗ )1+(A → ¬¬A )
[+¬¬A ]1
[A ]2
(⊕¬I.)⊕¬A
(¬I.)¬¬A
(Rejection)⊥
(SR2)2+A
(+→I.∗∗ )1+(¬¬A → A )
Proof of +((A → B ) → (¬B → ¬A )).
[+¬B]1
[+(A → B )]2 [+A ]3
(+→E.)+B
[¬A ]4
(¬E.)⊕A
(Weak Inference)3⊕B
(¬I.)¬B
(Rejection)⊥
(SR2)4+¬A
(+→I.∗∗ )1+(¬B → ¬A )
(+→I.∗∗ )2+((A → B ) → (¬B → ¬A ))
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Proof of (CNI*).
[+A ]1
.
.
.
⊥ [¬(A → A )]2
(Repetition)⊥
(SR2)2+¬(A → A )
[¬A ]3
(¬E.)⊕A
(Weak I.)1⊕¬(A → A )
(⊕¬E.)(A → A )
[+A ]4
(Repetition)+A
(+→I.∗∗ )4+(A → A )
(Rejection)⊥
(SR2)3+¬A
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